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ARE SOME WORDS BETTER LEFT UNPUBLISHED?:
PRECEDENT AND THE ROLE OF UNPUBLISHED
DECISIONS
K.K. DuVivier*
INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2000, a three-judge panel of the Eighth
Circuit issued a decision that, if followed nationwide, could
cripple our court system. In that decision, Anastasoff v. United
States,' the Eighth Circuit determined that the portion of its Rule
28A(i) providing that unpublished opinions could be cited but
were not binding as precedent, was unconstitutional.
The selective designation of some opinions as unpublished
is a fairly recent phenomenon for courts.' However, in the two
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1. Anastasoff v. U.S., 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot, 235 F.3d 1054
(8th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Eighth Circuit Judge Richard S. Arnold authored the majority
opinion and was joined in that opinion by Paul A. Magnuson, Chief Judge of the United
States District Court for the District of Minnesota, sitting by designation. Eighth Circuit
Judge Gerald Heaney filed a concurring opinion. Id. at 905.
2. Id.
3. In the early 1970s, appellate courts began to consider reducing the number of
published opinions to help manage their growing caseloads. Charles E. Carpenter, Jr., The
No-Citation Rule for Unpublished Opinions: Do the Ends of Expediency for Overloaded
ThE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS Vol. 3, No. 1 (Spring 2001)
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decades since its origin, the practice has grown.4 Now, almost
every circuit court, and many of the state intermediate level
appellate courts across the country, use unpublished opinions
extensively to handle heavy caseloads efficiently. If all cases
were treated equally, both in terms of the time to prepare them
and in terms of their weight as precedent, the impact could be
catastrophic.
Initially, it is important to clarify that the label
"unpublished opinion," as used by some courts, is a misnomer.
These opinions may be published, often on a web site or on
electronic databases such as Westlaw or LEXIS. Some
"unpublished opinions" also are available in bound volumes of
a reporter and have a citation. Further, with the advent of
electronic databases, all opinions-both "published" and
"unpublished" 
-soon may be equally available to practitioners.
Therefore, the main distinction between a published and
unpublished opinion is that unpublished opinions have not been
selected for official publication by the courts.
Although the existing nomenclature creates confusion, the
Eighth Circuit rule and others like it continue to provide the best
solution for how to deal effectively with heavy caseloads. First,
because electronic databases can make unpublished opinions
readily available, there is no need to see them as creating a body
of "secret" law. Second, although the courts may spend less
time on the unpublished opinions, if my experience as the
Reporter of Decisions for the Colorado Court of Appeals is
representative, the scrutiny and analysis unpublished opinions
undergo is sufficient to satisfy the judicial obligations imposed
by the Constitution. Finally, regardless of whether an opinion is
actually published in a book, it is helpful for courts to
distinguish between those opinions that are potentially more
valuable for the analysis of future cases (i.e. "published
Appellate Courts Justify the Means of Secrecy? 50 S.C. L. Rev. 235, 236, 241 (1998)
(citing The 1973 Report of the Advisory Council for Appellate Justice, statement of
Professor Robert J. Van Der Velde to the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the
Federal Courts of Appeals <http://app.comm.uscourts.gov/hearings/submitted/
VANDERVE.htm>).
4. The number of unpublished opinions rose steadily through the mid 1970s, "leveled
off in the 1980s," and now, "a majority of all final decisions by [the federal] courts of
appeals are unpublished." Boyce F. Martin, Jr., In Defense of Unpublished Opinions, 60
Ohio St. L.J. 177, 188 (1999).
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decisions") and others that are more routine (i.e. "unpublished
decisions"). In this way, a subsequent court can take the prior
court's determination of the significance of its decision into
consideration when performing its duty "to determine the law." 5
Using the traditional understanding of precedent to mean simply
that a line of prior cases should furnish a basis for determining
later cases, a case should not be arbitrarily controlled by one
prior decision simply because that decision came before it.
First, this article will provide background on the use of
unpublished decisions by different levels of the courts. Second,
it will explore the three ways unpublished opinions are treated
by the courts. Finally, it will respond to three pragmatic issues
relating to unpublished decisions that were raised by Anastasoff:
(1) the availability of these decisions, (2) the quality of the
reasoning in unpublished decisions, and (3) the treatment of
unpublished opinions as precedent.
I. THE COURTS AND PUBLICATION OF THEIR OPINIONS
There is wide variation among the roles of different courts
within the federal and state hierarchies.6 These roles, and the
resulting caseloads, impact whether a particular decision will be
published. In some courts, all of the opinions are published; in
others, virtually none. After discussing the role of unpublished
decisions in various courts, this article will focus primarily on
unpublished decisions in the intermediate appellate courts
because these are the courts that most often have unpublished
decisions by choice.
5. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 901 (quoting William Blackstone, Commentaries vol. 3, *
25). In Anastasoff, Judge Arnold interprets the obligations of a judge under Article II of
the U.S. Constitution. See generally id. at 899-904.
6. Article Ill of the United States Constitution vests "[t]he Judicial Power of the
United States... in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish." U.S. Const. art. III, § I. This language has resulted
in a hierarchy of three levels of federal courts: the district courts, the appellate courts, and
the United States Supreme Court. Similarly, most states have established a three-level
hierarchy of district, appellate, and supreme courts roughly parallel to the hierarchy in the
federal courts.
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A. District Courts
The district courts represent the front line for litigants
entering the judicial system. As a general rule, the role of the
district courts is to establish the relevant facts and law of a case
in making the record. By far, the district courts handle the
largest caseload. Nationwide, over 260,000 civil cases were filed
in the federal district courts during fiscal 1999.' The federal
district courts have a West reporter specifically dedicated to
their opinions-the Federal Supplement. Yet, each year only a
few' of the federal district court decisions are designated for
publication by each district court judge.8
The state trial courts play a parallel role to that of the
federal district courts. They are the initial point at which parties
can present facts and make a legal record. The state district
courts similarly handle the largest number of cases in the state
systems. For example, approximately 160,000 cases were filed
at the district court level in Colorado in 2000. 9 However, unlike
federal district court opinions, almost none of state district court
opinions are published.' °
B. Intermediate Appellate Courts
In most jurisdictions, litigants who are unhappy with the
outcome of their cases in the district courts are entitled to an
appeal of right to an intermediate appellate court. The primary
7. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Statistical Tables for the Federal
Judiciary: June 30, 2000.
8. Each judge decides what to submit for publication and posts it on the court's web
site. The publishers look at the web site to determine what they want to publish. Last year
in the federal district court in Denver, one judge published 36 opinions and another
published only one. On average, the federal district judges each choose approximately four
to six opinions per year to be published. Interview with Steve Ehrlich, Deputy Clerk of the
U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Dist. of Colo. (Nov. 1, 2000).
9. In 2000, there were 159, 596 cases (criminal and civil, excluding water cases) filed
in Colorado's district courts, and those same courts terminated 171,562 cases in 2000.
Colo. Jud. Branch FY 2000 Annual Rpt. at 27. <http://www.courts.state.co.us/annual2000/
tablel I.pdf> (accessed May 11, 2001).
10. Many of the decisions of district court judges are made orally, and only
extraordinary district court opinions are published. There are three places these opinions
are published: (1) in the standard periodicals in Colorado; (2) in the monthly state bar
journal, The Colorado Lawyer; or (3) in the weekly judicial newspaper, The Colorado
Journal.
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role of these courts is error correction: Litigants have the right to
have an appellate court determine whether the district court
judge made a legally significant mistake.
Because every litigant has this right to appeal, the workload
of these intermediate appellate courts can be staggering. For
example, the Ninth Circuit issued over 4,500 opinions in fiscal
1999, and the Fifth Circuit issued almost 4,000.' To handle this
heavy workload, several of the circuit courts designate only a
small portion of the decisions in these cases for publication. The
numbers vary from 46.1% published in the First Circuit to only
10.3% published in the Fourth Circuit. 2 Opinions that are
selected for publication are submitted to West Publishing for
placement in the Federal Reporter. In addition, as noted above,
both those opinions that are designated for publication and those
that are not are available on the federal courts' web site and also
are frequently available on the LEXIS and Westlaw electronic
databases.
Similarly, many state appellate courts designate the
majority of their opinions as "not selected for official
publication." 3 Despite a court's determination that an opinion
does not warrant publication in the official reporters, publishers
often will make these cases available to practitioners. The
publishers post the full text on their databases or publish a hard
copy of the case in a case reporter or periodical. 4 These
publishers generally print a caveat on the first page of the case
warning that the case was not selected for official publication."
11. The Ninth Circuit issued 4,507 opinions and the Fifth Circuit issued 3,957 opinions.
Admin. Off. of the U.S. Cts., Appeals Tables for the Twelve-Month Period Ending June 30,
2000, Table S-3.
12. Id.
13. The court allows motions requesting that an unpublished opinion be published.
Colo. App. R. 35. The motion is then circulated, along with a copy of the opinion, to all the
court of appeals judges, who then vote whether to publish the opinion.
14. Westlaw and LEXIS representatives said there is no systematic way of choosing
which unpublished opinions will be reported in their services. Instead, when a subscriber
asks about a particular opinion, then they acquire it from the clerk of the court and post it.
Interview with Danea Weidemann, Academic Account Manager, West Group (Oct. 30,
2000).
15. See e.g. 3d Cir. I.O.P 5.3 (2000) ("An opinion that is designated by the court as
unreported shall state 'unreported, not precedential' on the face of the opinion." ).
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C. Supreme Courts
While many intermediate court judges see their role as
principally error correction, the role of supreme court judges is
primarily to define the law. The supreme courts can spend
additional time on their opinions because appeal to the United
States Supreme Court and to the majority of state supreme
courts is not by right, but by certiorari, which is rarely granted.
For example, for the twelve-month period ending September 30,
1999, the U.S. Supreme Court denied 97% of the petitions for
certiorari filed to the Court and granted only 3%.6 Certiorari
denials by state courts are not as frequent as for the United
States Supreme Court, but petitions still are denied in the
majority of cases."
The United States Supreme Court issued only ninety-four
opinions in 1999." This represents slightly more than ten
opinions per justice. Similarly, the caseload of a state supreme
court justice is significantly lighter than the caseload of a state
appellate court judge. For example, in Colorado, each supreme
court justice issued approximately sixteen opinions in 2000. '9 In
contrast, each judge on the Colorado Court of Appeals issued
approximately 108 opinions.20 Because of their status as law-
defining cases, all United States Supreme Courts opinions are
published. Similarly, virtually all state supreme court opinions
are published.
16. Evan P. Schultz, Gone Hunting, Judge Richard Arnold of the 8th Circuit has Taken
Aim at Unpublished Opinions, but Missed His Mark, 78 Leg. Times (Sept. 11, 2000) (4,977
petitions denied and 137 granted).
17. For fiscal 2000, 1,617 cases were filed in the Colorado Supreme Court, and during
the same time period, only I Il written opinions were announced. This indicates that less
than 7% of the cases are given the written opinion treatment. Even this percentage probably
is overstated because some of these written opinions may have been in ballot title reviews,
water cases, and attorney disciplinary proceedings. Colo. Jud. Branch, FY 2000 Annual
Report at 7-9 <http://www.courts.state.co.us.annualrptlannual2000/tablel/pdf> (accessed
May 11, 2001).
18. Statistics for the Supreme Court's October Term 1999, 69 U.S.L.W. 3076 (BNA
2000).
19. Colo. Jud. Branch, FY 2000 Annual Report at 9 <http://www.courts.state.co.us/
annualrpt/annual2000/table5.pdf> (accessed May 11, 2001).
20. Colo. Jud. Branch, FY 2000 Annual Report at 18 <http://www.courts.state.co.us/
annualrpt/annual2000/table I0.pdf> (accessed May 11, 2001).
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II. TREATMENT OF UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS
There are three options that courts can exercise with respect
to unpublished opinions.2 First, some courts completely prohibit
the citation of unpublished opinions. Second, other courts permit
the citation of unpublished decisions, but will consider them
only as persuasive, not binding authority. Finally, the position
proposed by Anastasoff would not only permit the parties to cite
unpublished decisions freely but also require the issuing courts
to treat those decisions as controlling precedent.
A. Prohibiting Citation To Unpublished Decisions
At one time, the majority of federal circuit courts barred
entirely the citation of unpublished rulings.22 Although it is now
a minority position in the circuit courts, the no-citation rule is
still widely used.23 Some state courts also prohibit citation of
24
unpublished decisions. Although many of the rules that
prohibit citation do not address the status of the unpublished
decisions, the impact of prohibiting citation is equivalent to
denying a case precedential status.25 If a case may not be
discussed, then it is effectively unavailable for the court's
consideration.
This is consistent with the criteria used by courts to
determine which cases are to be published. The language in the
majority of these rules creates a presumption against
21. Some might consider a denial of certiorari as comparable to issuing an unpublished
decision. Schultz, supra n. 16, at 78. Although a denial of certiorari terminates a lawsuit
and has the effect of a summary affirmance, such decisions are not recognized as
establishing precedence.
22. Re Rules of the U.S. Ct. of App. for the Tenth Cir., Adopted Nov. 18, 1986, 955 F.2d
36, 38 n. 4 (10th Cir. 1992) (Holloway, C.J., with Barrett & Baldock, JJ., dissenting).
23. See 1st Cir. R. 36 (2000); 2d Cir. R. 0.23 (2000); 7th Cir. R. 53(e) (2000); 9th Cir.
R. 36-3 (2000).
24. For example, the Colorado Court of Appeals has forbidden citation to unpublished
decisions (with two exceptions) since 1994. Policy of the Colorado Court of Appeals
Concerning Citation of Unpublished Opinions, 23 Colo. Law. 1548 (1994).
25. For example, the Colorado rule states that "[tihose opinions selected for official
publication shall be followed as precedent by the trial judges of the state of Colorado."
Colo. App. R. 35(1) (Bradford Publg. Co. 2000). Although this rule does not state that
unpublished opinions may not be used as precedent, under the doctrine of expressio unius
alterius, the court seems to intend to use only published opinions for precedent.
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publication." Furthermore, the criteria set out attempt to define
the precedential quality of those cases chosen for publication by
defining their impact on subsequent cases. For example, the
Fourth Circuit rule states as follows:
Opinions delivered by the Court will be published only if
the opinion satisfies one or more of the standards for
publication:
It establishes, alters, modifies, clarifies, or explains a
rule of law within this Circuit; or
It involves a legal issue of continuing public interest;
or
It criticizes existing law; or
It contains a historical review of a legal rule that is not
duplicative; or
It resolves a conflict between panels of this Court, or
creates a conflict with a decision in another circuit.
27
Thus the courts, in choosing certain cases for publication
and passing over others, attempt to establish some cases as
precedent and deny precedential status to others.
B. Allowing Unpublished Decisions to be Cited and Used as
Persuasive Authority
The majority of federal circuit courts now have a rule that
is comparable to the Eighth Circuit's rule addressed in the
Anastasoff case.8 Most of these rules expressly permit citation to
unpublished decisions, but only as persuasive authority.29
Furthermore, several of these rules specifically state that such
citation is not favored. ° Because these rules permit citation to
26. E.g. 4th Cir. R. 36(a) (2000) ("[an opinion] will be published only if the opinion
satisfies one or more of the standards for publication") (emphasis added); Fed. Cir. R.
IO.P 10.4 (2000) ("The court's policy is to limit precedent to dispositions meeting one or
more of these criteria .. ") (emphasis added).
27. 4th Cir. R. 36(a) (2000); see 7th Cir. R. 53(c) (2000); 9th Cir. R. 36-2 (2000); Fed.
Cir. R. I.OP 10.4 (2000); Colo. App. R. 35(f) (2000).
28. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 899.
29. See 4th Cir. R. 36(c) (2000); 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4 (2000); 6th Cir. R. 28(g) (2000);
10th Cir. R. 36.3 (2000); 11 th Cir. R. 36-2 (2000).
30. E.g. 10th Cir. R. 36.3 (stating that citation to an unpublished opinion is disfavored,
but the opinion may be cited if "(I) it has persuasive value with respect to a material issue
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unpublished decisions, courts may use them in making
decisions. The controversy arises, however, from the statements
in these rules that the unpublished decisions are not binding
precedent."
C. Allowing Unpublished Decisions to be Cited and Used as
Binding Precedent
The Anastasoff case would radically alter the treatment of
unpublished decisions in the federal circuit courts. 2 Under the
Anastasoff reasoning, citation would be permitted for all cases.
Furthermore, all cases would be equally binding, regardless of
their status as published or unpublished. Consequently,
Anastasoff would alter the courts' existing practice of using the
classification of cases as either published precedent or
unpublished precedent as a signal to subsequent courts that one
case is more persuasive as a precedent than another case.
III. THE ROLE OF UNPUBLISHED DECISIONS
The process of choosing only some cases as precedent and
passing over others by designating them as unpublished has long
been controversial.33  Some commentators have criticized
that has. not been addressed in a published opinion; and (2) it would assist the court in its
disposition"); 4th Cir. R. 36(c) (stating that citation of the court's unpublished dispositions
is "disfavored"); 6th Cir. R. 28(g) (stating that citation of the court's unpublished
decisions is "disfavored").
31. E.g. 10th Cir. R. 36.3(A) (2000) ("Unpublished orders and judgments of this court
are not binding precedents, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel.").
32. Only the Fifth Circuit has a rule that designates certain unpublished decisions as
binding precedent: "Unpublished opinions issued before January 1, 1996, are precedent.
However, because every opinion believed to have precedential value is published, such an
unpublished opinion should normally be cited only when the doctrine of res judicata,
collateral estoppel or law of the case is applicable .. " 5th Cir. R. 47.5.3 (2000).
33. See Re Tenth Cir. Rules, 955 F.2d at 36 (Holloway, C.J., dissenting); see generally
David Dunn, Student Author, Unreported Decisions in the United States Courts of
Appeals, 63 Cornell L. Rev. 128 (1977); William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, An
Evaluation of Limited Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals: The Price of
Reform, 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 573 (1981) [hereinafter An Evaluation of Limited Publication];
William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, The Non-Precedential Precedent-Limited
Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 Colum. L.
Rev. 1167 (1978) [hereinafter The Non-Precedential Precedent].
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unpublished opinions for creating a body of "secret" law,34 and
other commentators have stated that permitting decisions to go
unpublished invites sloppy decisions, less judicial
accountability, and a lack of uniformity."
In addition to criticizing the process of designating some
opinions as unpublished, some commentators have specifically
attacked the rules that restrict citation to unpublished decisions.
These rules have been challenged on constitutional grounds suchS 36
as due process and equal protection. The appellate courts have
rejected prior challenges and have upheld circuit court rules
restricting citation of unpublished decisions. The Supreme Court
has declined to address their validity when it has had the
opportunity to rule on their constitutionality." The Anastasoff
case is remarkable because, unlike the prior appellate decisions
that upheld the circuit court rules on unpublished decisions, it
declares one of those rules unconstitutional."
In his majority opinion in Anastasoff, Judge Arnold
expanded on an idea that he first raised in a comment he wrote
about unpublished opinions approximately a year before.39 Judge
Arnold explains that "declar[ing] that unpublished opinions are
34. See, e.g., Carpenter, supra n. 3, at 236-237; Deborah Jones Merritt & James J.
Brudney, Stalking Secret Law: What Predicts Publication in the United States Court of
Appeals, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 71 (2001).
35. Martin, supra n. 4, at 180. For additional commentators who have criticized the use
of unpublished opinions, see id. at 180 n. II.
36. See generally Dunn, supra n. 33, at 141-45.
37. See e.g. Do-Right Auto Sales v. U.S. Ct. of App. for the Seventh Cir., 429 U.S. 917
(1976) (denying leave to file petitions for writs after the Seventh Circuit struck the
petitioners' citation of an unpublished decision); Browder v. Dir., Dept. of Corrections of
Ill., 434 U.S. 257 (1978). The Browder Court did not mention the no-citation question,
although it had granted certiorari on the issue; it left "the validity of the Seventh Circuit's
'unpublished opinion' rule.., to another day." Id. at 258-59 n. I.
38. The Anastasoff case held that the Eighth Circuit rule providing that unpublished
opinions are not precedent violated Article Ill of the United States Constitution. Anastasoff,
223 F.3d at 899. Ms. Anastasoff's case, seeking a refund for overpaid federal income taxes,
might seem inconsequential and mundane at first blush. She argued that her case should not
be controlled by an unpublished opinion that the Eighth Circuit had issued eight years
before and that one of the attorneys had dredged up out of the archives. This argument was
consistent with that of many a litigant before her because 8th Cir. R. 28(A)(i) specifically
stated that unpublished decisions were not binding precedent. However, Judge Arnold held
that the court was bound by the result in that unpublished decision because it was
precedent. Id. at 905.
39. Richard S. Arnold, Unpublished Opinions: A Comment, I J. App. Prac. & Process
219, 226 (1999).
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not precedent is unconstitutional under Article III, because it
purports to confer on the federal courts a power that goes
beyond the 'judicial."' 40 He further states that the rule violates
the duty of judges under Article III because the judicial power,
as contrasted to the legislative power, "is a power only to
determine what the law is, not to invent it., 41
The focus of this article is not the constitutional issues
raised by Judge Arnold and other commentators. Instead, this
article will focus on why courts should abandon the published v.
unpublished terminology, yet still continue the practice of
designating some opinions as less persuasive precedents. First,
there is no reason to create a secret body of law by keeping
some opinions unpublished; electronic databases can make all
opinions increasingly available. Second, the judicial process
would be significantly slowed if every case were allotted the
time now expended on only published opinions. The quality of
the reasoning in unpublished decisions is sufficient to meet
Constitutional requirements while also satisfying the parties'
needs for efficient resolution of a case. Finally, if attorneys are
inundated with all opinions that courts issue every year, it is
helpful for them to have a court's designation of which of these
opinions are to be treated as more persuasive.
A. Availability
The unpublished opinion debate is obscured by the focus
on whether or not an opinion appears in a book. 42 The issue is
not publication, but instead the weight of a judicial decision.
With the increased availability of opinions on electronic
databases, the dichotomy between published decisions and
unpublished decisions may become moot, at least from the
perspective of accessibility.
Many "unpublished" opinions are not truly unpublished;
they are available on court websites or private electronic
40. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 899.
41. Id. at 901.
42. "We do not mean to suggest that the Framers expected or intended the publication
(in the sense of being printed in a book) of all opinions. For the Framers, limited
publication of judicial decisions was the rule .. " Id. at 903.
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databases. 43  To understand the role of publication in the
discussion of unpublished decisions, it is helpful to note that the
earliest legal opinions were almost universally unavailable or
unpublished. Now that publication systems have been
established, we have moved to the present system of selective
availability: Some opinions are published, others are
unpublished. However, with improvements in technology, the
futuie may soon make all opinions universally available or
published. 4
When placed in historical context, "limited publication is
hardly a radical idea; until recently, case reporting has been a
haphazard enterprise. 45 In fact, the earliest decisions were not
published. In England, it was not until during the period of the
Year Books (ca. 1290-1535) that law students first reported
judicial sessions they attended.46 After the period of the Year
Books, private reports of cases began to be published, usually
named after some distinguished lawyer or judge.47 These reports
consisted of a mixture of facts, statements of the judges and
counsel, and comments from the reporters.48  They were
notoriously unreliable. 9
Similarly, the reporting of judicial opinions in the early
years of the United States was sporadic. There were no official
reporters of decisions and only a few private reporters. ° Most
states did not establish their own reporter systems until the
43. All the federal appellate court opinions and many state court opinions are public
record. Martin, supra n. 4, at 185. In addition, some of the circuits, such as the Sixth
Circuit, publish all of their decisions on their websites, and many of the unpublished
opinions are regularly available on Westlaw and LEXIS. Id.
44. Almost every federal court and state supreme court now provides some of its
opinions on websites, although most only provide recent opinions. Several appellate court
opinions also are available on these websites. For an up-to-date listing and links, see
<http://www.law.comell.edu/index.html> (accessed May 29, 2001).
45. Reynolds & Richman, An Evaluation of Limited Publication, supra n. 33, at 575.
46. Harold J. Berman & Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Transformation of English Legal
Science: From Hale to Blackstone, 45 Emory L.J. 437, 445 (1996).
47. Id. at 446.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See generally The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation 188-241, Table T.I
(Columbia L. Rev. et al. eds., 17th ed. 2000). The official United States Reports were not
published until 1893. Id. at 183; see Frederick G. Kempin, Jr., Precedent and Stare
Decisis: The Critical Years, 1800 to 1850, 3 Am. J. Leg. History 28, 34 (1959) (cited in
Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 903).
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1880s.' Between 1875 and 1900, West Publishing Company and
Lawyer Cooperative Publishing first established comprehensive
nationwide reporter systems."
As caseloads burgeoned, courts struggled to keep up.
Before 1964, nearly all federal opinions were published. Then,
the Judicial Conference recommended "[t]hat the judges of the
courts of appeals and the district courts authorize the publication
of only those opinions which are of general precedential
value." 53 The movement toward selective publication began in
earnest in the early 1970s when the Federal Judicial Center
recommended standards for publication.54 The Federal Judicial
Center's model rule stated that an opinion shall not be
designated for publication unless it meets one of the listed
criteria." Furthermore, the model rule specifically prohibited
• • • 56
citation of opinions not designated for publication.
One impetus behind restricting citation of the unpublished
decisions was the argument that it was unfair for one party to
have access to authority that another party did not have.
Publication assured a relatively level playing field. Many of the
rules on unpublished decisions now address the issue of
availability, at least among the litigants. They require that a
party citing an unpublished authority attach that authority to any
document citing it.57 This makes the opinion available equally to
all parties and to the court.
These rules do not, however, address the issue of one
party's having access to a bank of unpublished opinions. For
51. Some states have abandoned their official volumes for state opinions and now rely
exclusively on West Publishing for the official reports of their opinions.
52. Nancy P. Johnson, Robert C. Berring & Thomas A. Woxland, Winning Research
Skills 2 (rev. 4th ed., West 2000). It is interesting to note that Lawyers Cooperative
Publishing focused more on selective publication of cases valuable as precedents much like
the courts' designations of some opinions as "published."
53. Judicial Conf. of U.S., Reports of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the
United States 11 (1964).
54. See generally Standards for Publication of Judicial Opinions: A Report of the
Committee on Use of Appellate Court Energies of the Advisory Council for Appellate
Justice 1-21 (1973).
55. Id. at 22 (citing The Model Rule on Publication of Judicial Opinions).
56. Id. at 23 ("Opinions marked, Not Designated for Publication, shall not be cited as
precedent by any court or in any brief or other materials presented to any court" ).
57. See e.g. 5th Cir. R. 47.5.3 ("A copy of any unpublished opinion cited in any
document being submitted to the court must be attached to each copy of the document.").
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example, many federal and state governmental litigants have
access to prior cases argued by their departments. If all past
"unpublished" decisions were deemed binding on the court, the
governmental litigant would have the advantage-an
unrestrained choice about which unpublished cases to cite and
which to ignore. Although the court and other parties would
have the copy of the unpublished opinion attached to the brief,
they would not have ready access to the unpublished opinion
database to check whether the attached opinion was consistent
with other opinions or an anomaly.
Prior commentators have argued that permitting citation
will make unpublished opinions more accessible to the
uninitiated lawyers by alerting them to the existence of a
relevant case.5" In response to the concerns about access to the
entire database, some suggest opinions could be made available
by preparing rudimentary indexes and distributing them to
libraries and law schools. In addition, more and more courts are
now making their opinions available in electronic form. If
publishers are granted access to these opinions, they could easily
post all of the opinions on their electronic databases. Yet these
private services, such as Westlaw and LEXIS, may be too costly
for some practitioners. The Internet may be the ultimate answer
to the accessibility arguments. When a court web site is
available, all opinions-both those designated for publication
and those not designated for publication-could be posted there
for easy access by all of the public. If publication is removed
from the equation, the debate can then focus on the real issue-
the value of each opinion as precedent.
B. Quality of Reasoning
Last year, the Colorado Court of Appeals issued
approximately five times as many unpublished opinions as it
issued published opinions.6° If the court devoted the same
58. Reynolds & Richman, The Non-Precedential Precedent, supra n. 33, at 1199.
59. Re Tenth Cir. Rules, 955 F.2d at 37-38 (Holloway, C.J., dissenting).
60. In 2000, the Colorado Court of Appeals issued 291 published opinions and 1432
unpublished decisions. Colo. Jud. Branch, FY 2000 Annual Report at 18
<http://www.courts.state.co.us/annualrpt/annual2000/tablel0.pdf> (accessed May 11,
2001).
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amount of time to unpublished opinions as it allotted to
published opinions, cases might backlog for years.6' Because the
majority of decisions handled by intermediate appellate courts
are fairly routine and deal with the correction of error, they do
little to declare or forward the law. 6' Thus, the system is best
served by giving these cases more speedy and summary
treatment. Although some courts have moved to summary
opinions that merely state a conclusion, unpublished decisions
are better because they efficiently resolve a controversy, while
still providing litigants with some reasoning for the result.
Judges satisfy their Article III judicial duties when they
provide fair and consistent decisions along with analysis and
reasoning. Some unpublished opinions may be summary or per
curiam opinions that merely state an outcome without reasoning;
these summary dispositions are not the focus of this article.
Instead, the focus here is on those opinions that judges prepared
yet determined did not warrant publication according to the
criteria laid out in the rules.
Some argue that unpublished opinions are "dreadful in
quality." 63 Because the judges and their support staff spend less
time on these opinions, they may not be "the literary models
that [the courts] would like to produce as opinions." 64 However,
most judges take their work seriously and make every effort to
ensure that the outcome is both fair and timely for the litigants
and that the reasoning satisfies the requirements of Article III for
judicial deliberation.65
To get an idea of the effort put into an unpublished
decision, here is a description of how opinions are processed at
the Colorado Court of Appeals. Each morning when I arrived at
my office as the Reporter of Decisions for the Colorado Court of
61. Another option might be for the legislature to appropriate funds for additional
judges and court personnel.
62. Jerome I. Braun, Eighth Circuit Decision Intensifies Debate over Publication and
Citation of Appellate Opinions, 84 Judicature 90, 91 (2000).
63. William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New
Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 Cornell L. Rev. 273, 284 (1996).
64. Re Tenth Cir. Rules, 955 F.2d at 38 (Holloway, C.J., dissenting).
65. Some of the unpublished opinions contain lengthy explanations of the court's
analysis. See e.g. Rodriguez v. Healthone, 2000 WL 674860 (Colo. App. May 25, 2000),
modified on denial of rehearing (Colo. App. Aug. 24, 2000) (not selected for official
publication).
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Appeals, I glanced at my in-box. Usually the box was stacked
high with green papers. These papers were the "greens" -drafts
of opinions with a cover sheet printed on green paper. The
"greens" were opinions that the court planned to issue only to
the parties. They were not designated for official publication.
Before reaching my in-box, the "greens" had undergone
significant scrutiny. First, each case was assigned to a three-
judge panel of the Colorado Court of Appeals. This panel
initially determined that the case might be one that could be
resolved fairly simply. One of the three judges had the primary
responsibility for the case, and that judge worked with a staff
attorney or judicial clerk to review the record and to prepare an
initial draft of the opinion. This initial draft was called the
Predisposition Memo, and all three judges on the panel reviewed
this preliminary opinion. If the parties had requested oral
argument, the judges heard the argument and afterwards voted
on a final disposition of the case. If they agreed with the result
and the analysis in the Predisposition Memo, that memo would
become a "green." If two of the three judges did not agree with
the Predisposition Memo, the original "green" might become
the dissent, and another opinion was prepared. The "greens"
were then distributed to the majority of the judges on the Court
of Appeals to read.66 At the same time, a copy of this "green"
opinion was sent to me as the Reporter of Decisions for a final
review before it was mailed to the parties.
Approximately 83% of the over 1,700 opinions issued by
the Colorado Court of Appeals in fiscal year 2000 came through
this "greens" process. The remaining 291 cases received
different treatment because they were to become published
opinions. When any one judge on a three-judge panel assigned
to a case believes that the case may be one that should be
published, the preliminary opinion is then distributed with a
cover sheet on pink paper, instead of green, and becomes what
court personnel call a "pink." 6 7 If a "pink" remains slated for
66. Any judge can ask the full court to reconsider the status of a "green" case as
unpublished, and if a majority of the judges agree that it should be published, the case
switches to the published opinion track. See also James S. Casebolt, Procedures and
Policies of the Colorado Court of Appeals, 24 Colo. Law. 2105 (1995).
67. There are a few other situations that generate "pinks." For example, anytime ther
is a dispute among the three judges on a panel, the opinion is first distributed as a pink so
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publication, it is edited and then circulated to all sixteen judges
on the court of appeals with a blue cover sheet, so it is called a
"blue." 68
The cover sheet that circulates with the "blues" asks each
judge to vote on the opinion's publication status. If the majority
of the judges on the court check the line that recommends the
opinion should not be published, that opinion converts to a
"green" and continues through the same process as other
unpublished decisions. If, however, the majority of the judges
casts a vote in favor of publication, the "blue" is again
distributed to all of the judges before publication. Sometimes, if
there is debate about the reasoning or the result, all of the judges
will discuss and vote on the opinion in full court conference to
determine whether or not it should be published. If there are
revisions, an additional "blue" is circulated for review and
comment from the other judges. The Reporter of Decisions
reviews these opinions each time-once for unpublished
"greens" and three or more times for a published opinion.
This system guarantees that even the unpublished "green"
opinions are carefully reasoned. The process works now because
less than twenty percent of the opinions are slated for
publication. However, if every decision issued by the court took
the time to pass through the full procedure used for published
decisions, the court's ability to process opinions would be
reduced dramatically. Either additional judges would have to be
added to the court or else a backlog of cases would build up. If
litigants are satisfied with the efficiency of the process that is
now in place and the quality of the decisions they have received,
then dictating that each opinion receive equal time makes no
sense.
the Reporter of Decisions and other judges on the panel will have the opportunity to review
the written analysis of the opinion an additional time.
68. Colo. App. R. 35(f) was amended effective Jan. 1, 1984. Prior to this amendment,
the determination of which decisions were to be published was made by the Chief Justice
of the Colorado Supreme Court, the Chief Judge of the Colorado Court of Appeals, and the
Reporter of Decisions for the Colorado Supreme Court.
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C. Treatment of Unpublished Opinions as Precedent
If all judicial opinions become available, litigants will be
inundated with information, and it will be costly and difficult to
sift more persuasive precedents from the chaff. Judges, who deal
with the cases on a daily basis, and therefore, are best schooled
in determining which cases might be more influential for
subsequent decisions, should continue to help litigants by
designating some cases as weaker precedent ("unpublished" or
a comparable term) and some as stronger. Nothing in the
Constitution prohibits judges from providing this guidance.
If all judicial opinions are published, litigants will be
staggered by the research load. As early as 1671, an English
jurist wrote that the body of cases was "as the rolling of a
snowball, it increaseth in bulk in every age, until it becomes
utterly unmanageable." 69 The Federal Reporter increases now at
30 volumes per year70 and probably would be over 100 volumes
per year if unpublished decisions also were included.
When the federal courts first designated some opinions as
unpublished, the debate focused on the corresponding court
rules that prohibited their citation. If unpublished opinions are
readily available and now, according to more courts' rules, may
be cited, the debate shifts to the precedential weight of
unpublished decisions.
Anastasoff is correct in holding that unpublished opinions
are precedent." Other courts have expressed the same position
that "all rulings of this court are precedents, like it or not, and
we cannot consign any of them to oblivion by merely banning
their citation."" However, the conclusion that unpublished
decisions are precedent can be reconciled with the court rules
that describe them as only persuasive authority if we review the
historical meaning of precedent.
In the common law system, the law was established by "an
69. Braun, supra n. 62, at 91.
70. Id.
7 1. Anasrasoff, 223 F.3d at 905.
72. Re Tenth Cir. Rules, 955 F.2d at 37 (Holloway, C.J., dissenting) (citing Jones v.
Superintendent, Va. St. Farm, 465 F.2d 1091, 1094 (4th Cir. 1972)).
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infinite number of Grave and Learned Men,"73 i.e., the judges
who created the law through a long line of individual cases.
Even in many code systems, the law recognizes and
acknowledges the importance of prior decisions to interpret that
code 4 Through precedent, "the past is, for lawyers and judges,
a repository not just of information but of value, with the power
to confer legitimacy on actions in the present." 7
There is a distinction, however, between conferring
legitimacy and being completely bound. In this way, the concept
of precedent is distinguishable from the doctrine of stare decisis,
which first emerged in the nineteenth century.76 Stare decisis is
Latin for "to stand by things decided., 7  Black's defines it as
"[t]he doctrine of precedent, under which it is necessary for a
court to follow earlier judicial decisions when the same points
arise again in litigation."7 s
Although stare decisis incorporates the use of precedent,
the traditional concept of precedent is distinctive and predates
the doctrine of stare decisis. "Precedent" comes from the Latin
"praecddent" meaning "going before." 79  Traditionally,
"precedent" meant simply that the case was decided before
another. The Black's definition reflects this historical meaning:
"Precedent" means "[a] decided case that furnishes a basis for
determining later cases involving similar facts or issues."80
73. Thomas Hobbes, A Dialogue Between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common
Laws of England 55 (Joseph Cropsey ed., U. Chi. Press 1971).
74. Rudolf B Schlesinger, Hans W. Baade, Mirjan R. Damaska & Peter E. Herzog,
Comparative Law 643-51 (5th ed. 1988) (comparing the role of precedent in code and
common law systems).
75. Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 Yale L.J. 1029, 1032-33 (1990).
76. Berman & Reid, supra n. 46, at 449.
77. Black's Law Dictionary 1414 (Bryan A. Garner ed., West 1999).
78. Id.
79. The Random House Dictionary of the English Language: The Unabridged Edition
1130 (Jess Stein & Laurence Urdang eds., Random House 1971).
80. Black's Law Dictionary, supra n. 77, at 1195. It is beyond the scope of this article
to discuss in depth all of the normative presumptions necessary for applying this definition
of precedent. For example, it assumes that a later case could involve similar facts and
issues, but some cultures would reject this assumption because for them every situation is
unique. Some systems distinguish between using precedent for similar issues and using it
only for similar fact situations. Furthermore, facts or issues of a case must be reduced to a
certain level of abstraction to provide an analytic framework to compare them with the
facts or issues in another situation. Whenever we characterize a fact or issue as similar, we
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The broad concept of precedent should not be reduced to
the narrow doctrine of stare decisis. The decision in Anastasoff
seems to refer to the concepts interchangeably and to presume
both are immutable." Yet, precedent has been an evolving and
dynamic doctrine. None of the Western European legal systems
prior to the seventeenth century "established that judicial
decisions have normative force as a source of law.""8 Before that
time, selected judicial decisions were used to illustrate what the
law ought to be, 3 and were used "to illustrate legal principles,
but were not themselves an authoritative source of law." 8 4 In the
early seventeenth century, the concept that the courts should
follow previously enunciated rules arose, but the cases still
served only as examples of the rules.85 The governing thought
was still that a line of earlier cases illustrated judicial custom,
and this custom, rather than the individual cases, was something
that should not be overturned without good reason.86
When Blackstone opened the first course on English law in
1753, he based his method not on English law itself, but instead
on theories of philosophy, theology, and the natural sciences that
tested truth by conventions of the past.87 Thus stare decisis arose
from the concept that for our legal system to be fair, each future
decision should be consistent with each individual case that
came before it.
Yet, from the perspective of precedent, all cases are not
equal. Some may raise intriguing issues that have a profound
impact on the future. Others are more mundane and "add
essentially nothing to the corpus of law."88 American jurists
recognized the central role that precedent should play in judicial
decisions, but never required absolute adherence to it.89 By
are making certain assumptions about what is analogous or we are emphasizing certain
characteristics that others could find distinguishable. Id. at 1195.
81. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 903-04.
82. Rebecca Redwood French, The Golden Yoke 145 (1995).
83. Berman & Reid, supra n. 46, at 444-45.
84. Theodore F.T. Plunckett, A Concise History of the Common Law 260 (5th ed.,
Little, Brown & Co. 1956).
85. Berman & Reid, Jr., supra n. 46, at 445.
86. This concept was introduced by Sir Edward Coke. Id. at 446-47.
87. Id. at 449. See also William Blackstone, Commentaries vol. 1, 69-70.
88. Martin, supra n. 4, at 178.
89. Letter from James Madison to Charles Jared Ingersoll (June 25, 1831), in The Mind
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designating some cases as published and others as unpublished,
the judges themselves are attempting to predict which cases will
have future significance. The pressure to cite unpublished
opinions indicates that some practitioners disagree with the
court's determination.9 ° Yet, because the judges themselves have
a keen sense of what kinds of cases have come before them in
the past, they are probably best equipped to determine which
cases are exceptional.
If either published or unpublished decisions may be cited,
then either can be used as precedent to furnish a basis for
determining later cases. The rules that permit a court to indicate
which decisions are more likely to be significant can simply
provide guidance for future panels reviewing a similar issue.
The designation by the court of some cases as
"published" 
-- ones that might provide a more valuable guide
for future cases-and others as "unpublished," or less valuable,
more closely follows the pre-Blackstone concept of precedent.
The decisions that are published serve the same role as the
exemplary cases in earlier reporting systems, some of which
have endured until today. These earlier reporter systems
published only lead cases as models of what the law ought to be
and commented on them. Unpublished decisions also may be
cited because the courts "cannot deny litigants and the bar the
right to urge upon [them] what [they] have previously done." 9'
However, the courts should attempt to follow a body of law
instead of being slavishly tied to follow the result in each
individual case that came before.
As Oliver Wendell Holmes stated: "It is revolting to have
no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in
of the Founder: Sources of the Political Thought of James Madison 391 (Marvin Meyers
ed., rev. ed. U. Press of New Eng. 1981); Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical
Perspective: From the Founding Era to the Rehnquist Court, 52 Vand. L. Rev. 647, 662-66
(1999), cited in Note, Constitutional Law-Article 111 Judicial Power-Eighth Circuit
Holds That Unpublished Opinions Must Be Accorded Precedential Effect-Anastasoff v.
United States, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000), 114 Harv. L. Rev. 940, 943 n. 32 (2001).
90. Sometimes the judges miss the mark or there would not be any demand for
unpublished decisions. Obviously, the pressure to cite to unpublished decisions comes
because someone thinks the case is significant. See Gideon Kanner, The Unpublished
Appellate Opinion: Friend or Foe? 48 Cal. St. B.J. 386, 446 n. 75 (1973).
91. Jones v. Superintendent, Va. State Farm, 465 F.2d 1091, 1094 (4th Cir. 1972).
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the time of Henry IV." 92 Holmes found strict adherence to
precedent "an indefensible practice."93 According to Holmes,
past cases may "throw 'light' upon the present by helping us to
understand the quirky path by which we have arrived at our
current situation." 94 Yet, the doctrine of precedent should not be
narrowly construed as requiring that "the mere fact that the law
once had a certain content" is reason "for continuing to preserve
it in that form." 95
CONCLUSION
Improved technology may make published and unpublished
opinions equally accessible. However, courts and litigants
should continue to recognize that there are two tiers of
opinions-some more valuable as precedents and others less
valuable. Consequently, the present system of designating some
opinions as "unpublished" and yet allowing for their citation is
both efficient and appropriate. Most parties seek primarily a
resolution of their case based on some reviewable reasoning.
The majority are not concerned with creating new law and are
happy with the degree of judicial scrutiny their case receives.
In contrast, some decisions do have the potential to play a
more significant role in shaping future decisions. Courts should
be permitted to spend additional time in producing these
decisions. Likewise future courts should have the option of
weighing their significance more heavily when determining how
they should be applied as precedent.
92. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, in Collected Legal Papers 167, 187
(Peter Smith 1952).
93. Kronman, supra n. 75, at 1035.
94. Id.
95. Id.
